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ABSTRACT 
 
The orbitofrontal cortex has been speculated to play an important role in the 
processes that allow emotional factors to influence decision-making. In recent 
neuroimaging studies, orbitofrontal activity patterns have been linked to framing bias 
susceptibility in economic choice-behavior. However, it is still unclear whether 
orbitofrontal function directly contributes to the emergence of such observed framing bias. 
Hence, in the current study, we sought to examine the effect of orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC) lesions on framing bias by investigating economic choice-behavior of twelve OFC 
lesion patients using a financial decision-making task. Results showed OFC lesion patients 
exhibit marked reduction in framing bias, which indicated OFC lesions disrupt processes 
that adapt choice-behavior to contrasting affective contexts. Furthermore, OFC lesion 
patients were no more likely than controls to choose the gamble option over the sure 
option and vice versa in the task overall, which suggested that their reduced framing bias 
was neither due to generalized disinhibition of risk-taking tendencies, nor a broad and 
nonspecific shift in choice-preference irrespective of framing manipulations. Critically, 
OFC lesion patients revealed deficits in adjusting their choices according to varying 
reward magnitude and distinct relative reward values. This study provides key evidence in 
support of the hypothesis that the orbitofrontal cortex serves a critical role in guiding 
economic decision-making by integrating salient information about the affective context 
of potential choices.
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 “It is not to be forgotten that what we call rational grounds for our beliefs are 
often extremely irrational attempts to justify our instincts.” 
- Thomas H. Huxley from Aphorisms and Reflections 
 
Framing bias in economic decision-making 
Decision-making is heavily influenced by the emotional context in which the 
choices are presented. Cancer treatment options can be made less appealing to patients, 
as well as to expert physicians, when the anticipated treatment outcome is presented as 
mortality rate rather than survival rate. Individuals are more willing to accept a business 
contract under negotiation when the same offer is illustrated as gains rather than losses on 
their part. Even moral judgment on an ethical dilemma can be swayed by changing the 
word-order and phrasing that are used to describe the available courses of action (McNeil, 
Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; and Petrinovich & O’Neill, 
1996). This psychological phenomenon, known as the Framing effect, has been repeatedly 
demonstrated through a wealth of empirical data generated from a diverse set of 
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experimental paradigms across various domains of human judgment that involves 
decision-making (Kühberger, 1998). 
  Two psychologists, Kahneman and Tversky, recognized such deviation from 
rational decision-making as both systematic and pervasive in normative economic choice-
behavior and further integrated this insight as a key tenet in their Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). As an alternative to the 
Expected Utility Theory, which assumed individuals to be coolheaded, consistent, and logical 
decision-makers, the Prospect Theory acknowledged the counter-utilitarian and 
impressionable nature of the human mind and incorporated a behavioral model of 
economic choices that more successfully illustrated economic decision-making in the real 
world. A key piece of insight from this model was that individuals are more sensitive to 
losses than gains, and therefore impose a skewed weighting of importance in their 
economic choices by showing a greater degree of bias against choices perceived as losses 
compared to those perceived as gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Novemsky & 
Kahneman, 2005). Because attention paid to gains and losses is both inherent and salient 
in economic decision-making, it is likely to be particularly susceptible to the influence of 
framing biases.  
  Taking advantage of this knowledge, cognitive neuroscientists have been 
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employing economic decision-making tasks in neuroimaging studies to identify and 
elucidate the neural mechanisms from which framing biases originate. Recent 
neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural correlates of framing effect in human 
subjects, results of which appear to suggest that regions of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
are a key component contributing to the manifestation of framing biases. De Martino and 
colleagues (2006) conducted an fMRI study using a binary forced-choice financial 
decision-making task in healthy normal subjects to investigate the neural correlates 
associated with changes in choice behavior when options with equal mathematical value 
are framed as losses or gains (see task description in Methods section). Replicating common 
behavioral results associated with Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979), they found healthy normal individuals showed greater bias against 
economic choices framed as losses compared to choices framed as gains. More 
interestingly, the study also found a strong correlation between individual differences in 
the degree of framing bias displayed in their behavioral choice-patterns and blood oxygen 
level-dependent (BOLD) activation level in the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC). 
In particular, individuals who showed greater susceptibility to framing bias in the task 
exhibited diminished medial OFC activity (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 
2006). 
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Significance of OFC function in the emergence of framing bias 
Admittedly, it is still unclear as to what exactly the observed negative correlation 
between OFC activation and the framing bias magnitude reported in the De Martino et 
al. (2006) study represents with regards to the neurocognitive mechanisms involved. 
Nevertheless, one could hypothesize that OFC’s role in framing bias is directly related to 
evaluation of potential reward choices. This hypothesis implicates the preexisting 
knowledge about the OFC’s function to the emergence of framing bias. From this 
perspective, activity patterns in the OFC should reflect its influence on specific processes 
associated with valuation of reward choices. Indeed, accumulating evidence from 
numerous studies within the most recent decade suggest the OFC’s function in decision-
making as encoding reward value associated with various types of reward choices in both 
humans (Plassmann, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2007; FitzGerald, Seymour, & Dolan, 2009; 
Zald, 2009; Chib, Rangel, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2009; Kennerley, Behrens, & Wallis, 
2011) and in nonhuman primates (Tremblay & Schultz, 1999; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 
2008).  
  While OFC appears to be a key structure involved in value-coding of reward 
choices, it is worth noting that there are other regions in the brain besides the OFC that 
contribute to processing affective information related to economic decision-making. As is 
	   5	  
the case with other complex behaviors, cognitive processes distributed throughout the 
brain work in concert to give rise to economic choice behavior. For instance, the 
amygdala and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are two amongst several regions 
known to have significant affective processing functions. The amygdala, as already noted 
earlier, is thought to bias decision-making by detecting emotional salience of stimuli 
(Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999). The ACC, especially the dorsal portion, has 
been found to be responsive to outcomes considered aversive or signaling reductions in 
reward (Bush, Vogt, & Holmes, 2002). Moreover, prefrontal regions other than the OFC, 
such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), could contribute to decision-making 
by modulating the manner in which affective information is processed in economic 
decision-making. However, the OFC is known to have anatomical features fundamentally 
distinct from this and other prefrontal regions, resulting in computational capacity 
dissimilar from those regions (Zald, 2007). This suggests the possibility that the OFC 
could provide functionally distinct contributions to economic decision-making by 
mediating the reward valuation process of choice behavior (Padoa-Schioppa, & Assad, 
2006, Wallis, 2007; Plassmann et al., 2007). 
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OFC’s affective processing function influences evaluation of reward choices  
Reliable prediction and evaluation of reward value is important in decision-
making (Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). By the same token, without a reliable and context 
appropriate evaluation of different reward signals, economic decision-making processes 
can become very inconsistent (let alone rational). Because the availability of potential 
reward options frequently changes in the real world, encoding the relative reward value 
associated with the potential options allows for an efficient and flexible comparison of 
choices. OFC appears to be contributing to the evaluation of reward in this regard. For 
instance, monkey single-cell recording studies have shown increased activity in the OFC 
in response to expectation of the preferred reward between two options being compared.  
This is true regardless of the physical reward properties, (Tremblay & Schultz, 1999) as 
well as for relative preference of both rewarding and aversive outcomes (Hosokawa, Kato, 
Inoue, & Mikami, 2007).  
Furthermore, the OFC seems to be critical for processes that adjust the value 
assigned to available choices based on changing motivational significance of specific 
stimuli. Non-human primate studies show monkeys with OFC lesion continue to select 
foods that their healthy counterparts would have given up after becoming selectively 
	   7	  
satiated (Izquierdo, Suda, & Murray, 2004). Comparably, in a human neuroimaging 
study, participants who were fed to satiety on one type of food showed selective decrease 
in caudal OFC region’s BOLD signal in response to the specific stimuli of the satiated 
food. This signal decrease was coupled with subjective reduction in desirability of the 
satiated food (Kringelbach, O’Doherty, Rolls, & Andrews, 2003). Non-human primate 
lesion studies also appear to confirm the OFC’s key role in determining behavioral 
responses to reward-related decision-making. For example, an excitotoxic lesion to a 
monkey OFC causes impairment in suppressing previously learned stimulus-reward 
association (Dias, Robbins, & Roberts, 1996).  
  Taken together, the OFC’s activity appears to be sensitive to shifting motivational 
values assigned to various rewards and reward predicting signals, depending on the 
desirability and the availability of different alternatives. Much research has been done to 
elucidate the OFC’s functions in regards to its processing capacity relevant to economic 
decision-making, results of which suggest its important contribution to subjective 
valuation of reward. These findings suggest that the OFC is a key component for 
promoting choice-behavior adjustments in response to altered contingencies between the 
reward and reward predicting stimuli. Correlational evidence, however, from human 
neuroimaging studies investigating the neural correlates of framing bias may not be 
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sufficient to propose a causal link between the OFC and its hypothesized function in 
promoting the emergence of framing biases. Also, given available non-human primate 
lesion data, it is not unreasonable to suspect that the OFC may causally influence 
affective and motivational aspects of economic decision-making such as framing biases 
associated with monetary loss and gain.  
Current Study 
Here, we investigate to what extent OFC lesions in human subjects influence the 
normative patterns of economic decision-making, where choice-preference are flexibly 
adjusted according to the affective context in which available monetary reward option are 
presented. More specifically, we examined (i) whether OFC lesions undermine the 
normal process of reward-choice evaluation by disrupting processes that bias choice-
preference in contrasting affective context (i.e., monetary reward choices framed as losses 
or gains) and (ii) whether the putative deviation from normative choice-patterns in OFC 
lesion patients reflect generalized disinhibition of risk-taking tendencies and a broad shift 
in choice-preference; or more specific alteration associated with sensitivity to reward 
magnitudes. To addresses these questions, we used an economic decision-making task 
previously used in the De Martino et al. (2007) study. 
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  In accordance with prior studies that suggest OFC activity codes for subjective 
value of reward choices (Trembley & Schultz, 1999; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007) 
we predicted that OFC lesions patients would show less change in response to different 
affective contexts in which the monetary reward choices are presented. Specifically, we 
predicted that OFC lesion patients would show smaller magnitude of framing bias such 
that they would exhibit a lesser degree of choice-preference change in response to being 
presented with choices framed as losses versus gains. It was also predicted that lesion 
patients would show reduced sensitivity to varying reward magnitude compared to 
demographically matched controls. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHODS 
 
Participants 
OFC lesion patients 
 Twelve patients with OFC lesion were included in the study. They were recruited 
through the Vanderbilt University Medical Center Neurosurgery and Radiology Clinics. 
The Medical Center electronic data repository, Star-Panel, was used to identify OFC 
patients eligible for participation in the study. Star-Panel’s Neurosurgery and Radiology 
clinic databases were queried using OFC-related keywords: e.g., “orbitofrontal”; “inferior 
frontal”; “subfrontal”; “gyrus rectus”; “anterior communicating artery”. Relevant 
medical records of identified patients were reviewed to determine their eligibility, and 
eligible individuals were contacted in writing, to which they could respond their interest 
in study participation. All patients had a brain lesion affecting the orbitofrontal cortex 
(i.e., ventral surface of the prefrontal cortex that include gyrus rectus; medial orbital 
gyrus; anterior and posterior orbital gyri; and lateral orbital gyrus). The site of the lesion 
was ascertained by acquiring a brain MRI or CT scan in addition to radiologists’ or 
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neurosurgeons' reports. Exclusion criteria included damage outside the orbitofrontal 
cortex, alcohol or drug dependence, and a full-scale intelligence quotient (FSIQ) below a 
cut-off of 75 (1 standard deviation below the mean) in the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale – Third Edition (WAIS-III). Five of the patients were male and 7 were female, and 
their ages ranged from 26 to 56 years (mean = 42.6 years, SD =10.9 years). The time 
between surgery and their taking part in the study ranged from 1 to 12 years. Three had 
suffered from ruptured anterior communicating artery aneurysm which was clipped, 2 
had suffered from focal head injury, and 7 other patients had undergone resection of 
portions of the OFC due to the following: 3 from meningioma, 2 from intractable focal 
epilepsy, 1 from cavernous angioma, and 1 from neurofibroma. The study protocol was 
approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board. A complete 
description of the study was provided to all participants, and all subjects provided written 
informed consent. 
Healthy controls 
Twelve demographically matched healthy controls were recruited through 
advertisements posted on local craigslist webpage, a high-traffic online community 
featuring advertisements and forums. Each control subject was specifically recruited to 
match, within a pre-defined margin of difference, the demographics of the OFC lesion 
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patient that they were matched to. Specifically, matched-controls were no more than 3 
years younger or older; and within 2 years of difference in formal education level 
compared to the patient subject they were matched to. Controls were also matched for 
sex. Exclusion criteria included past history of head injury, drug and alcohol dependence, 
current use of psychoactive medications, past or current diagnoses of major psychiatric 
disorders, and a full-scale intelligence quotient (FSIQ) below a cut-off of 75 (1 standard 
deviation below the mean) as measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI). Healthy controls were well matched to OFC lesion patient participants’ age 
(matched-pairs t11 = - 1.0, p = n.s.), sex (all identical to matched patient), education level 
(matched-pairs t11 = 0.65, p = n.s.), full scale IQ (matched-pairs t11 = 1.16,  p = n.s.) and 
general memory (matched-pairs t11 = 1.62, p = n.s.) from the Wechsler Memory Scale – 
Third Edition (WMS-III).  
Questionnaire: State affect 
  Additionally, state (cf., as opposed to trait) measure of mood was assessed using a 
24-item version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded Form (PANAS-
X; Watson & Clark, 1999). The PANAS-X, a well-validated self-report measure of mood, 
was administered to all subjects on the day of testing prior to completing the economic 
decision-making task. Questions in the PANAS-X was comprised of 24 affectively 
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valenced words that subjects indicate the “extent to which they feel this way, right now” 
using a Likert scale from 1 (indicating “Not at all”) to 7 (indicating “Extremely”). For the 
present study, we used the total positive affectivity (PANAS-PA) and negative affectivity 
(PANAS-NA) scores (defined in Watson & Clark, 1999). There was no between-group 
difference in either the positive affect scores (matched-pairs t11 = -0.90, p = n.s.) or in the 
negative affect scores (matched-pairs t11 = -1.18, p = n.s.). A summary of demographics 
and neuropsychological testing data is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Means, standard deviations and group comparison of demographic data, IQ, 
memory, and affect scores 
Variable     OFC lesion Healthy controls 
  N Mean SD N Mean SD 
        
 Age 12 42.6 10.9 12 42.1 11.2 
 Male/Female 12 5/7  12 5/7  
 Education (years) 12 15 2.7 12 14.7 3.2 
 Full Scale IQ  
(WAIS-III or WASI) †  
12 110 *  13 12 116 10 
 General Memory (WMS-III) 12 108 13 12 117 16 
  
PANAS-PA 
 
12 
 
45.8 
 
2.9 
 
12 
 
43.0 
 
10.6 
  
PANAS-NA 
 
12 
 
27.7 
 
3.9 
 
12 
 
25.2 
 
5.3 
        
* One OFC patient’s FSIQ was estimated from Performance IQ (PIQ) due to incomplete test data. 
† WAIS-III was administered to OFC lesion patients and WASI was administered to healthy controls. 
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Verification of Lesion Location using Structural MRI  
For each OFC lesion patient, structural brain MRI scans were completed on a 3T 
Philips Intera Achieva scanner (The Netherlands) at the Vanderbilt University Institute of 
Imaging Sciences (VUIIS). High- resolution T1-weighted structural images (TR = 8.969 
ms; TE = 4.6 ms; in-plane resolution = 1 mm2; FOV=24x24cm2; matrix size=256x256; 
slice thickness = 1 mm; no gap) were acquired and used to ascertain the presence, 
location, and extent of the OFC lesion in each patient subject. Individual MRI scans were 
carefully screened to ensure that no lesion was present outside the OFC region. One 
subject was excluded from the study due to additional lesion in the parietal lobe. The T1-
weighted structural images for two participants were acquired on a 1.5 T Philips scanner 
(in-plane resolution = 1 mm2; slice thickness = 1.2 mm) due to contra-indications for 
higher field scanning. The common regions of OFC lesions were determined by creating 
an overlay images using the MRIcron image analysis program 
(http://www.cabiatl.com/mricro/mricron/; Rorden, Karnarh, & Bonilha, 2007). 
Patients with an OFC lesion due to a ruptured ACOM aneurysm – all of whom had 
lesions in the posterior portion of the gyrus rectus, right greater than left – were not 
included in the overlay image, due to technical difficulties creating an individual lesion 
maps (i.e., The nature of their lesion was vascular in origin, hence lesion-mapping 
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method used for surgical resections and focal damage cases did not work on structural 
images with ACOM aneurysm). Lesions were overlaid on an MNI template brain map 
provided by the MRIcron program. The most common overlap was found in the medial 
orbital gyrus, left greater than right (MNI coordinates x = - 12, y = 49, z = - 15, Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1. Overlap of lesions in OFC lesion patients (n=9), excluding ACOM aneurysm 
cases. Heat-map indicates the density of lesion-overlap (i.e., number of patients showing 
lesion to the colored area). 
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Behavioral Measure: Framing Task 
Task Design 
  A computerized financial decision-making task adapted from De Martino et al. 
(2006) was used to assess the effect of OFC lesions on normative framing biases associated 
with economic choices (Fig. 2). In this task, subjects received a cue indicating the amount 
of money that they would initially receive in that trial, after which they had to choose 
between a sure option and a gamble option presented in the context of two different 
frames. In the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross was shown at the center of a 
computer display for 2000 ms (“Start of trial”, Fig. 2). Subjects were then presented with, 
for 2000 ms, the amount of money they would initially receive in that trial: $50, $75, or 
$100, randomized across trials (“Initial amount”, Fig. 2). However, they were not 
guaranteed to keep this initial amount received. Rather, in the subsequent screen 
(“Choose between the gamble or sure option”, Fig. 2), subjects were asked to choose, 
within a 2000 ms window, between the sure option (to keep a portion of the initial 
amount with 100% certainty); and the gamble option (to gamble for a chance to keep the 
entire initial amount given with a known probability of winning or losing). In case the 
subject did not respond within the 2000 ms window, it was recorded as a no-response trial 
and excluded from analysis. The proportion of trials with no response was minimal in the 
	   17	  
OFC lesion group (mean % no response = 0.58%, SD = 0.51) as well as the control 
group (mean % no response = 1.25%, SD = 1.29), and there was no difference in the 
proportion for trials not responded (matched-pairs t11 = 1.61, p = n.s.). The sure option 
was formulated as either the amount of money to “KEEP” from the initial starting 
amount (e.g., “KEEP $20” of the $50, gain frame, Fig. 2A) or as the amount of money to 
“LOSE” from the initial amount (e.g., “LOSE $30” of the $50; loss frame, Fig. 2B). The 
proportion of initial amount offered in sure options was varied such that 20%, 40%, 60%, 
or 80% of the initial amount was offered for both framing types. For example, in case $50 
was given as the initial amount, monetary gain of $10 (20%), $20 (40%), $30 (60%), or 
$40 (80%) appeared as the sure option. The gamble option was identical in both frames 
and was represented as a pie-chart depicting the probability of winning (blue), or losing 
(red). The probability of winning/losing depicted in a pie-chart was: 20/80, 40/60, 
60/40, or 80/20. The expected value of the sure option and the gamble option within a 
given trial were matched such that the monetary amount offered through the sure option 
was equivalent to the mathematical product between the probability of winning in the 
gamble option (as shown via a pie-chart) and the initial amount the subject would win. In 
order to examine study subjects’ choice-preference pattern and risk-taking under 
uncertainty (i.e., unknown probability), trials where the pie-chart is not present (40% of 
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all trials) were also included in the task (Fig. 2C). Because the pie-charts conveyed to 
subjects the probability of winning if they were to choose the gamble option, missing pie-
charts meant unknown risk of not winning any money on that trial (or unknown chance 
of winning the entire sum of money). 
Catch-trials 
  In order to gauge the two groups’ ability to make optimal choices based on 
numerical comparison of dissimilar expected monetary values, “catch-trials” were 
included in the task (De Martino et al., 2006). In this type of trial (20% of the all trials), 
the expected value of the sure and gamble option were markedly unbalanced. Two types 
of catch trials were used for each: sure weighted - where the sure option was 50% of the 
starting amount and the gamble option was a 5% probability of winning the starting 
amount; and gamble weighted - where the sure option was 50% of the starting amount and 
the gamble option was a 95% probability of winning the starting amount.  
Task instruction and administration 
 Subjects were instructed to press the left arrow key (ß) for the sure option and the 
right arrow key (à) for the gamble option as the sure option always appeared on the left 
side of the computer display and the gamble option always on the right. After task 
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instructions, all subjects completed a block of 8 practice trials while the experimenter 
observed to ensure that subjected comprehended the task instructions given. All subjects 
were administered 360 trials in total (144 trials with pie; 144 trials with no-pie, 72 catch-
trials), evenly divided into 6 blocks with 60 trials within each block.  
  On trials where subjects chose the gamble option, subjects were not given any 
feedback about whether or not they won the gamble in individual trials. Instead, subjects 
were given a chance to take a brief period of rest after completing each block, during 
which they were presented with the total amount they have accumulated so far in the 
task, which included earnings from both the sure option as well as the gamble option. 
Subjects were informed that they would receive a sum proportional to their total winnings 
at the end of the experiment (up to $ 20).  
  For analyses using between-subjects paired t-tests, each control subject was yoked 
to one specific OFC lesion patient subject that they were matched to in terms of 
demographic variables. 
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Figure 2. The financial decision-making task 
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Choice-preference slope analysis 
  Each subject’s sensitivity to varying relative reward magnitude was quantified by 
examining the slope of choice-preference change relative to four different proportions 
offered for the sure option. For the sure option of a given trial, subjects were offered 20%, 
40%, 60%, or 80% of the initially received amount, from which they could choose to 
accept this sure option, or alternatively choose to gamble for a chance to keep the entire 
amount. For all subjects, proportion of trials chosen to gamble was plotted on a two-
dimensional space for each of the four different relative monetary values (20%, 40%, 60%, 
and 80%), by assigning to each point an arbitrary x-axis coordinate that is equidistant 
from their adjacent proportion(s) (specifically, 20%: x = - 1.5, 40%: x = - 0.5, 60%: x = 
0.5, 80%: x = 1.5). For each subject, a simple linear regression line slope was derived 
from these four points on a plane (i.e., coefficient b in the formula y = b x). Linear slopes 
for gain and loss framed trials were calculated separately. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESULTS 
 
Framing Task Results 
Catch-trials 
In catch-trials where the expected value of the sure and the gamble option was 
markedly unbalanced, each group as a whole made their decisions in directions consistent 
with the unequal weighting of the sure and the gamble options, albeit with some 
variability observed within each group (Fig. 3).  A repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) revealed that there was no main effect of Group (F1,22 = .20, p = n.s.) or Group 
by Weighting-type (i.e., sure- or gamble-weighted; F1,22 = .05, p = n.s.) interaction. This 
suggested that the two groups were statistically no different in making optimal choices in 
these trials. Moreover, there was a main effect of Weighting-type, such that subjects 
showed preference for the gamble option in the gamble-weighted trials compare to sure-
weighted trials (F1,22 = 60.69, p < 0.0001). Additionally, Further analyses of choice-
preference within each weighting-type using one-tailed null-hypotheses (probability of 
subjects choosing the gamble option in gamble-weighted trials ≤ 0.5 ; probability of 
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subjects choosing the gamble option in sure-weighted trials ≥ 0.5) revealed that controls, 
irrespective of framing-type, preferred the gamble option in the gamble-weighted trials 
(gain-frame: t11 = 2.16, p = 0.0267; loss-frame: t11 = 2.79, p = 0.0088), and preferred the 
sure option in sure-weighted trials (gain-frame: t11 = - 13.70, p < 0.0001; loss-frame: t11 = 
- 12.22, p < 0.0001). Similarly, OFC lesion patients, irrespective of framing-type, 
preferred the gamble option in the gamble-weighted trials (gain-frame: t11 = 1.85, p = 
0.0459; loss-frame: t11 = 1.96, p = 0.0379), and preferred the sure option in sure-weighted 
trials (gain-frame: t11 = - 5.01, p < 0.0004; loss-frame: t11 = - 4.06, p < 0.0019). This 
provided evidence that OFC lesion patients were able to make optimal decisions based on 
numerical comparison of expected value associated with potential choices. 
 
Figure 3. Subject performance on catch-trials 
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Choice-preference: percent gamble in trials overall 
  Patients with OFC lesions were no more likely than controls to choose the gamble 
option in trials overall (Fig. 4). On average, OFC lesion patients chose the gamble option 
in 43.6% (SD = 20) of all trials, and controls chose the gamble option in 42.9% of all 
trials (SD = 14). A matched-pairs t-test revealed that there was no group difference in 
proportion of trials chosen to gamble in trials overall (matched-pairs t11 = - 0.09, p = n.s.). 
Furthermore, overall choice preference for the gamble option or the sure option was 
statistically no different from chance (= 0.5) in either of the two groups (OFC lesion 
group: t11 = - 0.69, p = n.s.; control group: t11 = -1.69, p = n.s.). This indicated that the 
subjects displayed neither risk-seeking nor risk-aversion bias in their choice-preference. 
 
(Each error bar is constructed using a 95% confidence interval of the mean. Blue dotted 
line denotes the hypothetical point of complete ambivalence between two options) 
Figure 4. Mean proportion of trials chosen to gamble in trials overall 
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Choice preference: percent gamble in each framing type  
Patients with OFC lesion as well as healthy controls were both more likely to 
choose the gamble option when the sure option was framed as losses than when it was 
framed as gains (Fig. 5). A repeated-measures ANOVA with Group as a between-subjects 
factor showed that there was no between-subjects main effect of Group (F1,22 = .27, p = 
n.s.). However, there was a significant within-subjects main effect of Framing-type (gain 
vs. loss) such that proportion of trials subject chose to gamble in the loss frame was greater 
than that in the gain frame (F1,22 = 29.26, p < 0.0001 ). Additionally, a significant 
Framing-type by Group interaction was found (F1,22 = 4.9137, p = 0.0373), which 
indicated that the degree of increase in proportion gambled in the loss frame relative to 
the gain frame was dependent on the group, where the control group showed greater 
increase than the OFC lesion patient group.  
  Within the OFC lesion group, mean percentage of trials chosen to gamble was 
42.4% (SD = 21) of the gain frame trials, and this increased to 48.9% (SD = 23) in the 
loss frame trials (mean difference of 6.5%; matched-pairs t11 = 2.5, p = 0.0297). Likewise 
within the control group, mean percentage of choices for the gamble option was 35.8% 
(SD = 17) in the gain frame, whereas this increased to 50.4% (SD = 16) in the loss frame 
trials (mean difference of 14.6%; matched-pairs t11 = 4.68, p = 0.0007). 
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matched-pairs t-tests: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(Each error bar is constructed using a 95% confidence interval of the mean.) 
Figure 5. Proportion of trials chosen to gamble under different frames 
 
Shifting choice-preference: magnitude of framing bias 
  The magnitude of the OFC lesion group’s framing bias (mean = 6.5%, SD = 8.9) 
was significantly smaller (Fig. 6) than that of the control group’s (mean = 14.6%, SD = 
10.8): matched-pairs t11 = 2.45, p = 0.0321. The magnitude of framing bias was 
estimated for each individual from the difference in proportion of trials chosen to gamble 
between the gain and loss frame conditions (i.e., magnitude of framing bias = % gamble 
loss frame - % gamble gain frame).  
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* p < 0.05; Each error bar is constructed using a 95% confidence interval of the mean. 
 Figure 6A. Framing bias magnitude: group comparison (indexed from change in 
proportion of trials chosen to gamble; proportion gambled in loss frame – proportion 
gambled in gain frame) 
 
 
middle green line in each group represents the mean;  
upper and bottom lines are constructed using 95% confidence interval of the mean 
Figure 6B. Framing bias magnitude: individually plotted 
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Shifting choice-preference: choice-preference and amount offered 
 
OFC lesion patients’ choice pattern in response to varying proportions of initial 
amount offered for the sure option indicated their diminished behavioral sensitivity to 
variations in monetary value (Fig. 7). Comparison of linear slopes derived from choice 
patterns in varying reward magnitudes (see Methods for mathematical derivation used) 
indicated that controls exhibited a robust decrease in preference for the gamble option as 
the proportion offered from the initial amount increased in the sure option, and these 
negative slopes were significantly different from zero (gain frame: mean slope = -17.7, SD 
= 12, t11 = - 5.05, p = 0.0004; loss frame: mean slope = -15.4, SD = 14, t11 = - 3.89, p = 
0.0025). In contrast, the OFC lesion group’s linear slope was not significantly different 
from zero in either of the two framing conditions (gain frame: mean slope = -0.04, SD = 
22, t11 = - 0.70, p = n.s.; loss frame: mean slope = -0.004, SD = 21, t11 = - 0.07, p = n.s.). 
  
 
 
 
 
(Each error bar is constructed using a 95% confidence interval of the mean.)  
Figure 7. Proportion of trials gambled for sure options varied in % of initial amount 
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  Additionally, the OFC lesion group’s slope was significantly less steep compared 
to the control group’s slope. Levene’s test for unequal variances revealed unequal 
variances between the two groups (gain frame: F1,12 = 7.84, p = 0.0104; loss frame: F1,12 = 
3.46, p = 0.0764), therefore, a direct group comparison of the slopes were completed 
using the Welch’s t-test that assumes unequal variances between groups. Based on the a 
priori prediction that the OFC lesion patient groups’ reward magnitude sensitivity would 
be reduced compared to controls (i.e., slope would be less steep than that of healthy 
controls), using one-tailed tests was justified. As predicted, the OFC lesion group’s slope 
was less steep in both the gain frame (Welch’s t17.1 = 1.83, 1-tailed p = 0.0426) as well as 
the loss frame (Welch’s t18.8 = 2.05, 1-tailed p = 0.0274). 
Sensitivity to relative monetary values 
OFC lesion patients displayed blunted sensitivity to differences in the relative 
value of monetary offers. Across a subset of trials in the task, the relative monetary value 
of the sure option was varied while the absolute monetary amount offered as earnings for 
the sure option was held constant. For example, a trial offering $20 from the initial 
amount of $100 as the sure option and another trial offering $20 from the initial amount 
of $50 as the sure option in principle offered the same amount of money. However, the 
two sure options each represented monetary offers of distinct relative value. In the former, 
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only 20% of the initial amount was offered, while in the latter, 40% of the initially 
presented amount was being offered. In order to examine the effect of differences in 
relative monetary value on choice-preference, trials with identical dollar amount offered 
as the sure option were further segregated depending on how much proportional value 
the amount represented relative to the initial amount presented to the subject. This 
resulted in four pairs of possible comparison, each of which offered two distinct relative 
monetary values but of identical absolute monetary amount: $20 offered (20% of $100; 
and 40% of $50), $30 offered (40% of $75; and 60% of $50), $40 offered (40% of $100; 
and 80% of $50), and  $60 offered (60% of $100; and 80% of $75). For each one of these 
four pairs, a matched-pairs test was performed to detect the presence of choice-preference 
bias against the sure option offering lesser relative monetary value. One-tailed tests were 
used for these tests, since the sure options associated with greater proportional value were 
expected to be more desirable than those with lesser proportional value.  
  Across all four monetary amounts, controls were consistently more likely to choose 
against the sure option that has lesser value relative to the initial amount presented (Fig. 
8): $20 (matched-pairs t11 = - 3.01, one-tailed p = 0.0060); $30 (matched-pairs t11 = - 1.94, 
one-tailed p = 0.0390); $40 (matched-pairs t11 = - 2.99, one-tailed p = 0.0062); and $60 
(matched-pairs t11 = - 2.26, one-tailed p = 0.0226). However, OFC lesion patients’ choice 
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patterns indicated that they did not discriminate between distinct relative values 
associated with sure options: $20 (matched-pairs t11 = - 1.14, one-tailed p = n.s.); $30 
(matched-pairs t11 = 0.06, one-tailed p = n.s.); $40 (matched-pairs t11 = 0.14, one-tailed p 
= n.s.); and $60 (matched-pairs t11 = 0.56, one-tailed p = n.s.). 
 
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Each error bar is constructed using a 95% confidence interval of the mean. 
Figure 8. Comparison of proportion-gambled when sure options across trials offered 
different relative value (relative to initial amount shown) but identical absolute amount 
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No Pie-chart vs. Pie-chart 
 Comparison of trials presented with and without a pie-chart for the gamble option 
indicated that in both groups, absence of a pie-chart (as compared to the presence of it) 
enhanced differentiation of choice-preference in regards to the variation in relative (i.e., 
proportional) monetary values of the sure option. A repeated-measures ANOVA, with 
Group as a between-subjects factor; Pie-chart-presence as a within-subjects factor; and 
linear slope derived from proportion gambled in response to variation in reward 
magnitude as a dependent measure was conducted for each frame-type. In the gain 
frame, there was no between-subjects main effect of Group (F1,22 = 3.58, p = n.s.), or 
Group by Pie-chart-presence interaction (F1,22 = 0.21, p = n.s.). However, a main effect of 
Pie-chart-presence was observed such that subjects were more sensitive to reward 
magnitude change in trials where the gamble option did not provide information about 
the probability of winning (F1,22 = 20.58, p = 0.0002). Results were similar in the loss 
frame. There was no between-subjects main effect of Group (F1,22 = 2.41, p = n.s.), or 
Group by Pie-chart-presence interaction (F1,22 = 2.37, p = n.s.). But a main effect of Pie-
chart-presence was observed such that subjects were more sensitive to reward magnitude 
change in trials with no pie-chart present (F1,22 = 19.20, p = 0.0002). 
Further analyses indicated that, for each framing-types, steeper choice-preference 
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changes were observed in trials without a pie-chart compared to trials with a pie-chart 
(Fig. 9) for both the OFC lesion group (gain frame: matched-pairs t11 = - 2.75, p = 
0.0189, loss frame: matched-pairs t11 = -3.39, p = 0.006); and the control group (gain 
frame: matched-pairs t11 = - 4.89, p = 0.0005, loss frame: matched-pairs t11 = -2.91 , p = 
0.0143).  
When the reward magnitude sensitivity (linear slopes) of OFC lesion patients and 
controls were directly compared, the two groups were not different in their sensitivity to 
reward magnitude change in no pie-chart trials, as evidenced by no group difference 
between mean slope coefficients: gain frame (matched-pairs t11 = - 1.53, p = n.s.), loss 
frame (matched-pairs t11 = - 1.30, p = n.s.). This result showed that OFC lesion patients’ 
choice-preference pattern in the no pie-chart trials were similar to that of healthy 
controls, in contrast to their choice-behavior in trials presented with a pie-chart which 
showed clear difference from controls (Fig. 10). 
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matched-pairs t-tests: p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(Each error bar is constructed using a 95% confidence interval of the mean.) 
Figure 9. Linear regression slopes in pie-chart present and pie-chart absent trials 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Choice-preference patterns in pie-chart present and pie-chart absent trials 
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Reaction time (RT) 
  A repeated-measures ANOVA showed that there was no main effect of group 
(F1,22 = 1.04, p = n.s.). However, there was a significant main effect of frame (gain vs. loss) 
such that time taken to reach a decision in the loss frame was significantly slower that that 
in the gain frame (F1,22 = 7.27, p = 0.0132). Additionally, a significant frame by group 
interaction was found (F1,22 = 5.12, p = 0.0339) which indicated that the degree of change 
in reaction time was dependent on the group. Further analysis indicated that there was no 
group difference in median reaction time for either of the two framing types (gain frame: 
matched-pairs t11 = 0.73, p = n.s.; loss frame: matched-pairs t11 = 1.64, p = n.s.). 
However, within-group analysis revealed that the control group subjects took significantly 
more time to reach a decision in loss-framed trials (mean of median RT = 1613 ms, SD = 
368 ms) than in gain-framed trials (mean of median RT = 1502 ms, SD = 350 ms) with a 
difference of 111 ms (matched-pairs t11 = 3.69, p = 0.0036, see Fig. 11). This was not the 
case for the OFC lesion group, as their performance indicated that there was no reaction 
time difference (matched-pairs t11 = 0.29, p = n.s.) between the two framing types: gain 
frame (mean of median RT = 1395 ms, SD = 400 ms); loss frame (mean of median RT = 
1405 ms, SD = 429 ms).  
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 matched-pairs t-test: ** p < 0.01 
Each error bar is constructed using a 95% confidence interval of the mean. 
Figure 11. Time taken to choose between two options under different frame types 
	   37	  
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The current study found that individuals with OFC lesions display attenuated 
choice-preference adjustment to contrasting affective context. Specifically, it was shown 
that OFC lesion patients’ framing bias magnitude – as measured by the difference in 
proportion of trials chosen to gamble between trials with financial choices framed as loss 
versus gain – was smaller than that of healthy controls. OFC lesion patient subjects’ 
choice-patterns in catch-trials as well as no-pie chart trials indicated that they were able to 
make the numerical comparison and appropriately weigh the value of two potential 
choices. Nevertheless they showed marked reduction in sensitivity to the affective context 
within which the potential monetary reward choices were embedded in (e.g., framing of 
potential choices as gains versus losses; potential choices offering different proportion of 
initial amount or different relative value). This is the first demonstration to our knowledge 
of human subjects with OFC lesion exhibiting reduced framing bias in an economic 
decision-making task. This extends previous work in human neuroimaging studies that 
suggest possible involvement of the medial OFC region in contributing to the emergence 
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of framing biases  (Deppe et al., 2005; De Martino et al., 2006; Tom et al., 2007).  
De Martino et al. (2006)’s pioneering fMRI study using the same behavioral task 
as the current study found that higher OFC activity was associated with reduced framing 
bias, which can be speculated as evidence in support of the OFC as a neural substrate 
that contributes to reducing susceptibility to framing bias. Based on this notion, one 
would predict increased framing bias in individuals with OFC lesion. However, this was 
not the case in the present study. Rather, we found the exact opposite results, with OFC 
lesion patients showing more “rational” or “description-invariant” pattern of choice-
behavior. While diminished influence of framing manipulations on choice-behavior may 
be considered more “rational” in the context of the decision-making task we used in the 
study, this pattern of choice-behavior may be far from adaptive decision-making in real 
life. It has been speculated that human emotion has been developed as a mechanism to 
more efficiently guide behavior (Damasio, 1994). In this sense, framing bias manifested by 
healthy normal subjects can be considered as a process that enables expedient 
adjustments of choice-behavior to meet the needs of the contexts within which decision-
making takes place.  
This notion of the OFC as a critical component in affectively guided decision-
making is partially supported by evidence from a previous neuroimaging study that 
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demonstrated OFC’s activation patterns share a remarkably similar trajectory with 
behavioral pattern of choice-preference that reflect greater magnitude of subjective value 
assigned to financial options framed as gains compared to those framed as losses (Tom, et 
al., 2007).  In their study, authors illustrated that patterns of “neural-loss-aversion” 
(defined as difference between the slope of decreased regional brain activity in response to 
increasing loss and the slope of increased regional brain activity in response to increasing 
gain) was observed in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) activity such that greater 
magnitude discrepancy in VMPFC BOLD signal change between increasing loss (which 
resulted in VMPFC signal decrease) and increasing gain (which resulted in VMPFC 
signal increase) was associated with greater degree of behavioral loss aversion. This 
finding suggests that the ventro-medial region of the OFC activity patterns may 
contribute to choices that individuals make under the perceived context of decision-
making. Findings from our study support this view and further suggest the general role of 
the medial regions of the OFC as a neural substrate that guides choice-behavior by 
integrating affectively relevant contextual information such as framing of financial choices 
that suggests potential gains or losses and variation in the subjective and relative value of 
monetary reward offered. 
Results from the current study additionally offer new insight into the original 
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findings reported by De Martino et al. (2006). In their study, authors reported that 
greater activity in the medial and central OFC regions were associated with decreased 
susceptibility to loss aversion related framing bias in economic decision-making. The 
authors speculated that, subjects with greater OFC activity associated with framing may 
have had more refined neural representation of their own emotional biases, thus allowing 
them to make their decisions more rationally. Based on this interpretation, we would have 
expected to see greater framing biases in lesion patients compared to controls. However, 
we found the opposite result of OFC lesion patients exhibiting attenuation of affective 
biases in decision-making. Our findings directly challenge the original interpretation by 
De Martino et al. (2006), and further suggest that functions of the OFC associated with 
representing affective significance of potential choices may subserve and promote the 
emergence of framing biases. It is possible that the correlation observed between framing 
susceptibility and OFC activity in the De Martino et al. (2006) study was due to 
asymmetric brain activity patterns elicited in response to choices framed as losses versus 
those framed as gains (Tom et al., 2007). 
Importantly, OFC lesion patients did not manifest a general pattern of increased 
risk-seeking or risk-aversion in their choice-preference. This was reflected in their rate of 
choosing the gamble option in trials overall, which was comparable to that of controls.  
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This finding provides support for the idea that OFC damage may not necessarily lead to 
generalized disinhibition of risk-seeking. Our finding, however, must be understood from 
a context distinct from a previous report of left orbitofrontal lesion patients showing 
greater risk-seeking tendencies in a probabilistic gambling task (Floden, Alexander, Kubu, 
Katz, & Stuss, 2008). In contrast to the lack of trial-by-trial feedback in the economic 
decision-making task utilized in our study, the task used by Floden et al. (2008) provided 
specific feedback to subjects about the outcome of their choice in each trial, which could 
significantly alter the property of gambling behaviors in the task over time. Hence, their 
left OFC lesion patients’ increased rate of choosing risky choices may reflect more of the 
patients’ inability to appropriately incorporate task feedback to adjust their choices rather 
than a general mechanism of disinhibited risk-seeking.  
The present study also found support for OFC as a neural substrate that enables 
adaptable choice-preference differentiation in value-based decision-making. Healthy 
controls showed a robust decline in their tendency to choose the gamble option when the 
alternative, the sure option, offered increasingly greater proportion of initially received 
amount. This clearly demonstrated that controls were able to differentiate their choice-
preference in accordance with varying relative reward magnitude of the potential choice 
presented to them. However this was not the case with OFC lesion patients, as their 
	   42	  
choice-preference patterns were essentially invariant across different proportions of 
monetary reward offered, indicating their diminished sensitivity to using relative reward 
magnitude information to guide their choice-behavior. OFC lesion patients also exhibited 
diminished sensitivity to differences in the relative value of monetary reward. This was 
apparent from comparing choice-patterns in trials with sure options of equal absolute 
amount that are different in their relative value (when compared to the initial amount 
offered). These results extend evidence from non-human primate single-cell recording 
studies that show OFC’s crucial function of coding for the relative preference of 
rewarding (Tremblay & Schultz, 1999) as well as aversive outcomes (Hosokawa, Kato, 
Inoue, & Mikami, 2007). In our study, financial choices framed as losses never truly 
resulted in tangible monetary losses. However, when contrasted with other trials with the 
sure option framed as gains, choices framed as losses were subjectively an aversive 
outcome to subjects engaged in the task. Hence, our data may suggest that OFC lesions 
lead to disruption not only in the processing the emotional significance of potentially 
rewarding choices but also of potentially aversive ones. 
The current study also found that when the reward value of the probabilistic 
option (i.e., gamble option) is uncertain, patients and controls show greater sensitivity to 
variation in values associated with the sure option. In other words, when subjects lacked 
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information about the probability of winning for the gamble option, (note that this 
effectively converts the gamble option to a psychologically ambiguous choice where 
individuals assume a 50/50 chance of winning), patients as well as controls showed 
greater degrees of differentiation among different relative reward values presented in the 
sure option. More importantly, OFC lesion patients’ sensitivity to variation in reward 
values was not different from that of controls in these trials. In contrast, patient subjects 
were less sensitive to change in monetary reward magnitude variation compared to 
controls in trials with known probability of winning for the gamble option (i.e., trials with 
a pie-chart present). This showed that OFC lesion patients have an intact ability to 
process numerical value-related information, which further suggests that their diminished 
sensitivity to varied reward magnitude in the pie-chart present conditions do not reflect a 
general deficit in value comparison. 
Our observation of control subjects showing increased reaction time in the loss-
framed trials, as compared to the gain-frame trials is consistent with other studies that 
report similar findings of slower reaction time observed in negative compared with 
positive framings (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993 Gonzalez, Danda, Koshino, & Just, 
2005). This may potentially reflect an extra step required to avoid the loss framed option 
and then consider the alternative option (gamble) than to just directly choose the certain 
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(gain). The finding of no difference in reaction time for the patient group demands further 
clarification. However, our finding suggests that OFC lesion patients may not be 
processing the gain and loss framed choices in a very different manner judging from the 
reaction time data as well as our results showing significant attenuation in their framing 
bias. 
Our results raise further questions to be answered involving the specific affective 
processing functions associated with sub-regions of the OFC. In the present study, the 
common area of lesion was identified as the left medial OFC, near the medial orbital 
gyrus and gyrus rectus. Interestingly, it has been demonstrated that lateral regions of the 
OFC responds in a different manner compared to medial regions of the OFC. For 
example, in an fMRI study where subjects were asked to consume highly palatable food 
such as chocolate beyond satiety, the medial OFC activity showed commensurate 
decreased after satiety, in keeping with the diminishing reward value of the chocolate they 
were asked to consume, but activity in the lateral OFC increased showing the opposite 
pattern to the medial OFC activity (Small, Zatorre, Dagher, Evans, & Jones-Gotman, 
2001). This and other studies have suggested that while medial regions of the OFC serve 
the function of coding for subjective reward values, the lateral portion of the OFC seems 
to be more involved in suppressing or overriding previously acquired stimuli-reward 
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contingencies. (O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001; Kringelbach, 
2005). Observation of distinct activity patterns in the lateral OFC raises further questions 
about the involvement of other sub-regions of the OFC and the nearby frontal cortex 
region.  
It is worth noting that the current study’s OFC patients showed significant lesion 
overlap in the left hemisphere (see Figure 1). In the De Martino et al. (2006) study, OFC 
activity associated with individual differences in framing bias was found more in the right 
than the left. This particular finding of framing-bias-associated OFC activity being more 
lateralized to the right hemisphere was not explicitly addressed by the authors. However, 
another previous fMRI study using an economic decision-making task, not specifically 
related to framing bias, has reported similar patterns of right-sided OFC activity when 
subjects were exposed to financial outcome of gains versus losses (Kuhnen & Knutson, 
2005). Assuming a greater role of the right OFC function in promoting framing bias, it is 
possible that potential OFC lesion patients with more right sided OFC lesion show 
greater attenuation of framing biases.  
Moreover, correlational evidence from neuroimaging studies provide support for 
the involvement of posterior regions of the ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC, BA 
47/12) in down-regulating amygdalar activity (Ray & Zald, in press). While amygdalar 
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activity was not a determinant of inter-subject variability in framing bias in the De 
Martino et al. (2006) study, it did predict within-subject choices that are in accordance 
with framing manipulations. Hence, it is possible to speculate that VLPFC exerts 
inhibitory influence on framing biases. Future research addressing such questions about 
the laterality of OFC’s contribution to framing bias and clarifying possible involvement of 
other frontal regions near the medial OFC can further augment the finding from the 
current study. 
The present study provides distinct contribution to our understanding of the 
OFC’s role in framing effect and value-based decision-making. The current study 
additionally demonstrates how behavioral economics can be applied in lesion studies to 
test hypotheses relevant to the functional significance of neural substrates being studied. 
Moreover, in comparison to previous neuroimaging studies that provide correlational 
evidence, the present study offers a more direct examination of the medial OFC’s 
contribution to affective biases involved in decision-making processes. Future lesion 
studies could augment findings from the current study by further investigating the 
involvement of other sub-regions of the OFC in context dependent and value-based 
decision-making. 
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